A secret White House document urging a policy of support to racist white-minority regimes in southern Africa was brought to light in an article by Tad Szulc in the October issue of Esquire magazine. The document, National Security Council Decision Memorandum, was prepared under the direction of Henry Kissinger. It outlined five options for a strategy for holding in check the Black liberation struggles and preserving the status quo in southern Africa.
The “general posture” recommended in the memorandum was for the United States to “... maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states.”
Option 2 called for Washington to indicate to the colonial-settler regimes its “willingness to accept political arrangements short of guaranteed progress toward majority rule....” This policy was “personally recommended” by Kissinger, columnist Jack Anderson reported October 11. It was the one former President Nixon approved, in February 1970.
After its adoption, Option 2 acquired the name “Tar Baby” among White House advisers. Its fundamental assumption was stated as follows:
“The whites are here [in Africa] to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost.”
To keep the backlash to an “acceptable” level, White House strategists suggested that the plan be carried out carefully, gradually, and secretly. “... given the sensitivities of the black American community and church and liberal groups,” Szulc pointed out, “Tar Baby’s” aims had to be carefully concealed.
The document recommended the following “Operational Examples” as ways of putting the plan into practice:
“Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes.”
“Permit U. S. naval calls in South Africa with arrangements for nondiscrimination toward U.S. personnel in organized activity ashore; authorize routine use of airfields.”
“Remove constraints on EXIM [Export-Import] Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage U.S. exports and facilitate U.S. investment.”
“Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military.”
“Without changing the U.S. legal position that South African occupancy of South-West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the U.N.”
“On Rhodesia, retain consulate; gradually relax sanctions (e.g., hardship exceptions for chrome) and consider eventual recognition.”
“Continue arms embargo on Portuguese territories, but give more liberal treatment to exports of dual-purpose equipment.”
“Toward African insurgent movements take public position that U.S. opposes use of force in racial confrontations. Continue humanitarian assistance to refugees.”
“Establish flexible aid programs in the black states of the region; respond to reasonable requests for purchase of non-sophisticated arms.”
The document envisaged that Washington would preserve its “economic, scientific and strategic interests in the white states and would expand opportunities for profitable trade and investment.” (There is now approximately $1,000 million in U.S. private investment in South Africa.)
Szulc pointed out that “Tar Baby” was consistent with the top-secret contingency planning that the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been engaged in for well over a year. The overall aim is to extend their air and naval operations to the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas around southern Africa. The planning is being carried out at the Norfolk, Virginia, headquarters of SACLANT – the acronym for Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic – and was initiated by a secret order from NATO’s Defense Planning Committee in June 1973. The declaration issued by the June 1974 meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in Ottawa gave formal approval for the expansion of NATO operations, in effect giving NATO carte blanche to assume military responsibilities wherever it wishes.
The concrete results of the White House’s adoption of the “Tar Baby” strategy are becoming increasingly apparent.
The “arms embargo” against South Africa has been given an extremely liberal interpretation. The South Africans have been allowed to buy Bell helicopters capable of being used in police or military operations, as well as twin-engined Lear-jets that can be outfitted for reconnaissance and certain combat or suppression missions. Herbicides and defoliants of the type used in Vietnam have also been sold to South Africa.
Lisbon received the same generous treatment. Boeing 707 airliners that the Portuguese government bought were used to transport combat troops to Africa. Portuguese officers have been trained in counterinsurgency at the U.S. Army’s jungle-warfare school at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, and at Fort Benning, Georgia. Portuguese jet pilots received training in West Germany, where the U.S. has a number of large air bases.
Direct links between the U.S. and South African military services are increasing. The May 27 Far Eastern Economic Review reported that Washington receives information from a supersecret South African communications station that tracks Indian Ocean shipping all the way into the Bay of Bengal. According to Szulc, the U.S. also has missile-tracking facilities and a space-tracking station in South Africa. In addition, he reported, “the Central Intelligence Agency and the South African secret services cooperate closely under the terms of a secret intelligence agreement....”
Connie Mulder, the South African interior and information minister who may be next in line for prime minister, paid an “unofficial” visit to Washington in January. While there he met with then Vice-President Gerald Ford, Senate minority leader Hugh Scott, Senate minority whip Robert Griffin, and House majority leader Thomas O’Neill, among others. The least publicized part of his trip was a visit to the Pentagon, where he met Vice-Admiral Raymond Peet. Peet is a senior official in the office for International Security Affairs, which has responsibility for planning strategy in the Indian Ocean. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, the South African press hailed Mulder’s visit as the opening of a new era in U.S.-South African cooperation in the Indian Ocean.
In May, the commander in chief of the South African military forces, Admiral Hugo Biermann, visited Washington and met with the acting secretary of the navy, J. William Middendorf. He also met with other government and military officials at informal gatherings. One dinner given for him by a Republican congressman was attended by seventeen admirals.
The U.S. Navy has previously used ports in Angola and Mozambique. But with the threat that the new regimes in these countries may close port facilities to the U.S., the Pentagon is looking more and more to Pretoria. Although the U.S. has renewed the agreement for its base on the Arab-Persian Gulf island of Bahrain, and is also going ahead with the construction of a large base on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Pentagon planners would also like to use the wellequipped naval bases in South Africa.
With the increased strategic importance of the oil-tanker routes around South Africa and with the impetus given to the African liberation struggle by the ending of direct Portuguese rule in some of its colonies, an increased effort to strengthen the links between Washington and South Africa may not be far off.
Source: https://www.themilitant.com/Intercontinental_Press/1974/IP1238.pdf#page=15&view=FitV,35