In a new escalation of its war threats against Vietnam, Washington issued a bellicose statement January 13 warning that North Vietnam “must accept the full consequences of its actions” in “turning from the path of negotiation to that of war.” A State Department spokesman declined to elaborate on what the “full consequences” might be, but more concrete indications of Washington’s intentions were soon provided.
On the day the statement was released, the Pentagon announced that the aircraft carrier Midway, along with two destroyers and a guided missile frigate, had left Japan for an undisclosed destination. The January 14 New York Times reported that some Pentagon officials “suggested that the Midway had no specific orders to head for Vietnamese waters, but that the Administration wanted to keep this option open....” According to the January 15 Le Monde, the flagship of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the Oklahoma City, had also left Japan the previous week for an unknown destination.
Preparing further for renewal of direct U.S. military intervention in Vietnam, the State Department said on January 14 that Washington felt free to breach the Vietnam cease-fire accords because Hanoi had supposedly already violated them. This argument was used as justification for reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam, specifically banned by the accords.
At a news conference January 14, Pentagon head James Schlesinger virtually acknowledged the flights. When asked whether they were going on, he said, “The blatant failure of North Vietnam to live up to its commitments has created a set of circumstances different from those at the time of the signing of the Paris peace treaty.”
Washington’s war moves became more open after the liberation of the provincial capital Phuocbinh and the intensification of the fighting in Cambodia at the beginning of the year. But these events were merely the pretext. The escalation was planned some time ago.
According to a January 10 New Asia News dispatch, a secret conference held in Hawaii December 12-14 was attended by all U.S. ambassadors in Asia, military commanders in the Pacific, and top Pentagon officials. The situation in South Vietnam was a major topic at the conference. Even before the ominous mobilization of the U.S. warships, a large-scale U.S. military training operation began in Okinawa on January 1. This operation was reportedly much larger than any undertaken even at the height of the Vietnam war. At the same time, several thousand U.S. troops were sent from Okinawa to the Philippines, and some marine units were placed on a four-hour alert.
“Officials concede privately,” reported the January 14 Washington Post, that the administration “... is using the current wave of attacks to support its case for increased aid.” Washington’s threatening statement and its justification of the reconnaissance flights were seen by a correspondent writing in the January 15 New York Times as “part of a concerted Administration effort to persuade Congress to allocate more military aid to Saigon.”
On January 8 President Ford announced that he would be asking Congress for at least $300 million in extra military aid for Saigon. Now it appears he will be asking for $150 million to $200 million in additional aid for Pnompenh as well, the January 17 New York Times reported.
For the past few weeks, the U.S. press has pushed Ford’s campaign, featuring stories on the situation of the besieged residents of Pnompenh faced with a big “offensive” by the insurgents.
In fact, the “offensive” appears to be nothing more than the usual steppedup fighting that occurs in the dry season. The changing factor is the corrupt Lon Nol regime itself, which is crumbling without too much pressure from the Khmer Rouge. The January 8 Washington Post reported that “diplomatic sources estimate that considerably fewer insurgent troops have so far been involved” in this year’s dry season fighting than in last year’s. They have also been hampered by the lack of sophisticated weapons such as the heat-seeking SA7 rocket and 130mm artillery, according to the January 17 Far Eastern Economic Review.
Virtually the entire countryside and all roads to Pnompenh have long been controlled by the insurgents. The Mekong River had been Pnompenh’s main supply link with the outside world, normally accounting for 80 percent of the supplies to the city, but that has now been cut. The January 16 Washington Post reported that no supply convoys had been able to make the trip from Saigon for twenty-six days. The regime’s control of Neak Luong, the one remaining outpost on the river, thirty-two miles southeast of Pnompenh, was reportedly precarious.
Faced with the collapse of its puppet in Pnompenh, Washington warned of its intention to resume direct U.S. intervention in the war in Cambodia, if necessary. The U.S. Embassy in Pnompenh announced on January 16 that there was an emergency contingency plan to use the U.S. Air Force to run a large supply airlift into Cambodia to keep the regime from falling. This would be done only “as a last resort,” the embassy said.
In a sense, this airlift has already begun, on a small scale so far, and with some rather crude attempts to disguise it. Since last October, the January 17 New York Times reported, “in response to the growing political hostility at home to the continued American involvement,” the United States has turned over air supply duties “to a so-called civilian contractor in Thailand named Bird Air.”
“But the move was largely cosmetic,” the Times continued, “for under the contract Bird Air was simply given several Air Force transport planes – with the insignia painted out. The pilots, who are described as civilians, are mostly ‘returned’ Air Force officers.
“Because this operation resembles other earlier extralegal programs run by the United States Government in Indochina, there has been speculation that this one too is extralegal, and could be connected with the Central Intelligence Agency, which has financed airlines in the region.”
In the past few weeks. Bird Air flights have increased from two to ten a day. According to the January 14 Washington Post, Cambodian authorities banned reporters from visiting the field near the aircraft landing area, saying that the ban was on the advice of the U.S. Embassy. “Reliable American sources in Phnom Penh confirmed that the embassy had ‘suggested’ to Cambodian authorities not to allow newsmen to take pictures or obtain information about the airlift.” One of the U.S. “civilian” pilots was wounded by antiaircraft fire on January 15.
Although forced to tread warily for fear of provoking domestic protest, Washington is more and more openly intervening to prop up its puppet regime in Cambodia.
“The embassy [in Pnompenh] gives the impression,” reported the January 17 New York Times, “that the White House is determined to keep the Lon Nol Government from falling and will take all steps necessary to accomplish this – even if it necessitates exceeding the aid limits set by Congress.”
Increased aid is only part of Washington’s plan. According to a January 10 New Asia News dispatch, Noel Gaylor, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, told NBC News that U.S. troop commitments into Southeast Asia cannot be ruled out.
Having declared that it doesn’t feel bound by the Paris agreements, and having indicated by past actions that congressional limitations can be circumvented, any statements by Washington that it won’t resume direct military intervention in Indochina without first getting approval from Congress can be regarded as mere window dressing. In fact, the very denials are intended to condition public opinion to the possibility of renewed U.S. aggression against the peoples of Indochina.
Source: https://www.themilitant.com/Intercontinental_Press/1975/IP1303.pdf#page=8&view=FitV,3